The role of sovereign credit ratings in fiscal discipline by Duygun, M. et al.
The Role of Sovereign Credit Ratings in Fiscal Discipline
Meryem Duygun ∗ Huseyin Ozturk † Mohamed Shaban ‡
February 19, 2016
Abstract
This paper investigates several aspects of the relationship between sovereign credit ratings and
fiscal discipline. The analysis of over one thousand country–year observations for 93 countries
during the 1999–2010 period reveals that a country’s debt level is likely to increase with higher
ratings, confirming the existence of pro–cyclicality and path dependence of ratings. In addition,
the study finds no evidence to support the theory of Political Business Cycle, which implies that
political ambitions may lead to fiscal worsening following a rating upgrade. The study findings
further demonstrate that institutional quality is an important factor in the ratings–fiscal discipline
nexus.
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1 Introduction
Concerns about fiscal discipline became a central decision–making parameter of sovereign credit
ratings (ratings) after the 2008 financial crisis. On 5 August 2011 Standard & Poor’s (S&P)
downgraded the US debt from AAA to AA+ for the first time in its rating history. Two years
later, on 13 February 2013, the UK lost its Aaa rating, which it had had since the 1970s, as
Moody’s downgraded the UK economy by one notch, to Aa1. On 13 July 2012, Italy’s rating fell
by two notches (from A3 to Baa2). Japan’s rating was threatened several times. Recently in July
2015, Fitch warned Japan against loss of fiscal discipline that could harm the country’s economy
by putting upward pressure on bond yields.
Vigilance of debt dynamics has also become more apparent in emerging market countries. In
September 2015, Fitch’s country report stated that the main drivers for affirming Turkey’s rating
were the government’s strong fiscal discipline which was maintained through the elections and com-
mitment to this discipline. In September 2015, S&P also praised Mexico for its ”Fiscal Discipline
Law”, which addresses the agency’s key concerns. S&P regards the law as successful because of its
potential for maintaining sustainable debt levels.
Fiscal discipline in a monetary union can be even more challenging, while fiscal discipline in a
monetary union without a central fiscal authority is very hard to achieve. The latest experience in
the EU shows that debt sustainability issues in one member country can have significant impacts
on other members due to the financial linkages arising from a single monetary policy and common
currency. Although it has direct distorting effects, fiscal discipline in developed countries has not
been a major concern for their ratings until the cascading crisis in the EU. Balassone et al. (2006)
argue that ratings did not seem to substantially penalize fiscal profligacy in developed countries
before the outbreak of the 2008 crisis. The literature on the determinants of ratings of emerging
market countries is not in full agreement as to whether there is a substantial association between
fiscal variables and ratings (Kumar and Ter-Minassian, 2007). The lack of adequate evidence on
debt levels in explaining sovereign creditworthiness was also discerned by Celasun and Harms (2011)
who emphasize that external debt figures are among the usual suspects when it comes to explaining
sovereign risk, but academic endeavours to further understanding of the impact of debt level on
sovereign creditworthiness are rather limited.
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This study investigates the impact of ratings and rating changes on fiscal discipline in the context
of two complementary discussions on the understanding of the ratings–fiscal discipline nexus. The
first one is the pro–cyclicality and path dependence of ratings with which we explore whether higher
ratings create incentives to accumulate higher debt. The pro–cyclicality and path dependence of
ratings suggest that ratings are closely associated with business cycles and rating history. The
idea behind pro–cyclicality is that credit rating agencies (CRAs) might be overly optimistic in
their rating assessment when the economy performs well (Ferri et al., 1999; Dimitrakopoulos and
Kolossiatis, 2015). In a similar vein, path dependence simply means that ratings do not change
considerably even if the country’s fundamentals suggest it (Bangia et al., 2002; Dimitrakopoulos
and Kolossiatis, 2015). Pro–cyclicality and path dependence of ratings create huge room for debt
accumulation for high–rated countries, since an event risk that will drastically shatter their ratings is
very low. The second discussion is the theory of Political Business Cycles (PBC), which, following
from the seminal papers of Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1986), models government investment
behaviour when governments are constrained by their political objectives. We analyse how fiscal
policies respond to rating changes under the theory of PBC which imply that fiscal and economic
policies are closely affected by political motivation. We expect that opportunistic governments will
increase their borrowing in an optimistic environment created by a rating upgrade.
Ratings issued by CRAs play a critical role in determining the cost and availability of capital
to countries. Since the investment decisions of international investors are based on comparative
assessments in the same asset class, ratings juxtapose each country based on its willingness and
capacity to pay. It is well known that CRAs rigorously monitor countries’ fiscal discipline. The
rationale suggests that countries that have low levels of debt and fewer refinancing needs tend to
get higher ratings. However, we still do not know the nature of the relationship between ratings
and sovereign indebtedness (Celasun and Harms, 2011). Although the relationship between fiscal
discipline and ratings has a direct impact on the probability of sovereign debt default, it has not
attracted the research interest it deserves (Ferri et al., 1999; Celasun and Harms, 2011). A number
of studies have focussed on the sources of persistence of ratings (including path dependence), pro–
cyclicality and serial correlation (see e.g. Dimitrakopoulos and Kolossiatis, 2015), but how these
factors affect sovereign borrowing has not been studied.
Opaqueness also surrounds the question of whether rating changes alter borrowing motivation
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opportunistically. The disciplining role of ratings on fiscal discipline has been studied through the
lens of PBC theory around election times (Hanusch and Vaaler, 2013; Block and Vaaler, 2004)
but these studies do not provide any evidence in general on how rating changes affect borrowing
propensity.
This study aims to address these questions. We extend our research agenda by incorporating
the level of ”development” in our research questions. Whilst many institutional differences have
been pointed out as key determinants for fiscal discipline and the rating decision, the question of
how the relationship between ratings and fiscal discipline differs according to level of development
remains unanswered.
The empirical analysis of over one thousand country–year observations for 93 countries during
the 1999–2010 period largely supports our conceptual framework and related predictions. Specifi-
cally, we find that countries’ debt levels are likely to increase with higher ratings, thus confirming
the existence of pro–cyclicality and path dependence in ratings. However, we find no evidence to
support the PBC theory. The findings suggest that governments do not exploit the supportive
upgrade environment to borrow more, but show that this holds true only for the governments in
developing countries. The results further demonstrate that governments with high institutional
quality perform better in terms of fiscal discipline following a rating upgrade.
The paper contributes to the literature in at least three ways. First, we examine how pro–
cyclicality and path dependence of ratings can impact government debt dynamics. Although the
drawbacks related to pro–cyclicality and path dependence of ratings have been debated from many
perspectives, the implications of these problematic issues are fairly scarce. Second, we explore
whether governments take advantage of their high ratings and further exploit the opportunities
created by rating upgrades. In particular, we are motivated by the theory of PBC, which posits
that politicians often act in line with their opportunistic objectives. The opportunity to find cheaper
and more abundant capital is expected to entice politicians to borrow more. Finally, we test for
the effects of the rating changes in developed and developing countries separately, where there are
considerable discrepancies in the quality of institutions. The results will be essential to determine
whether governments’ responses to rating changes are different in these two country groups.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly summarizes the theoretical
discussion on pro–cyclicality and path dependence of ratings and the theory of PBC. Section 3
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presents the data from 93 countries with cross–country comparisons and a brief discussion about
the methods used. Section 4 reports and discusses the main findings and implications, and Section
5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Debates and Hypotheses
2.1 Theoretical Debates
A review of the debates on the role of CRAs in the current financial system will set the scene
for the specific implications of this study. It is widely known that the regulations governing the
current financial architecture, in place since the beginning of the nineties, afford due importance
to the credit risk of financial assets and entities. Credit ratings are the main pillar of credit
risk measurement in financial institutions essentially because the regulations are ratings–based.
Although certain regulations are in place to ensure that the vitality of credit ratings remains fairly
high, the credit rating industry is dominated by three big agencies (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch) which
operate with an issuer–pays model. The market structure of the industry and its business model
have attracted significant criticism of credit rating accuracy.
Among many issues of concern regarding ratings and CRAs, this paper focuses on the pro–
cyclicality and path dependence of ratings. One of the fundamental criticisms of CRA ratings is
that, contrary to expectations that ratings should act as an early warning system, CRAs tend to
over–rate in good times and be over–cautious in bad times (Pagano and Volpin, 2010; Eijffinger,
2012). The lack of proper signalling and inaccurate assessment of credit risk has prompted fierce
debate among players in the global financial system. Several regulatory changes have been intro-
duced since the 2008 financial crisis, although it is hard to say that the new regulatory regime
has completely alleviated the concerns about ratings. The gradual development of countries’ fun-
damentals suggests that ratings are highly dependent on past ratings. The belief that CRAs do
not upgrade countries even if they demonstrate dramatic improvements in their fundamentals does
not motivate policymakers to take timely action. On the other hand, the belief that CRAs do not
downgrade enough even in cases where high–rated countries show significant deterioration in their
credentials lead to reckless behaviour among policymakers.
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2.2 Hypotheses
In this research, we propose three hypotheses to examine the relationship between fiscal disci-
pline and ratings.
2.2.1 Fiscal Discipline and Ratings
We first examine the relationship between ratings and fiscal indicators. Pro–cyclicality and path
dependence of ratings can be potential sources of misalignment in ratings. Ratings are defined
as being pro–cyclical when CRAs assign higher ratings to countries than their macroeconomic
fundamentals would justify during ”bad times” and shy away from downgrading even if their
fundamentals suggest they should do so during ”good times”. A clear example of pro–cyclicality
of ratings occurred when the ratings of major EU countries were sharply downgraded during the
EU debt crisis (Ga¨rtner et al., 2011; Eijffinger, 2012; Paudyn, 2013). The fiscal indicators of these
countries had already been alarming in the run–up to the crisis. However, rather than responding
to fiscal deterioration in a timely and gradual way as CRAs are supposed to, downgradings were
both tardy and acute.
We argue that the pro–cyclicality and path dependence of ratings create more borrowing in-
centives for high–rated countries since the lower sensitivity of ratings to debt levels creates a false
impression that their ratings will remain unchanged. Therefore, we expect a significant association
between ratings and sovereign borrowing. As an initial exercise, we test the implication of the pro–
cyclicality and path dependence of ratings on fiscal indicators. Since high–rated countries can find
cheaper and more plentiful funding opportunities, these countries’ fiscal indicators are generally
expected to be worse than lower rated countries 1. The expectation that their ratings will hardly
change feeds this anomaly (Paudyn, 2013).
Hypothesis 1: Fiscal indicators are negatively associated with ratings.
1Over–reliance of debt markets on credit ratings is the main reason for the cheap funding and high rating
relationship. See Eijffinger (2012), Pagano and Volpin (2010), White (2010), Ozturk (2015) and Paudyn (2013) for
an excellent discussion.
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2.2.2 Political Opportunism and Rating Changes
The other fundamental research proposition in this study is that, based on the considerations
linked to the theory of PBC, opportunism may play a significant role in politicians’ borrowing
propensity in the context of the positive environment created by a rating upgrade. The main
assumption in the traditional theory of PBC is that politicians, whose preference is to stay in
power, are opportunistic whereas voters are short–sighted meaning that they tend to vote for the
incumbent if the conditions before the election are beneficial to them (see e.g. Nordhaus, 1975;
Hibbs, 1986; Hanusch and Vaaler, 2013; Block and Vaaler, 2004). The theory hypothesizes that
politicians are always faced with a trade–off between political and economic objectives. A vigilant
politician who seeks long–term economic benefits prefers to maintain fiscal discipline and even
improve it after a rating upgrade. In contrast, an opportunistic politician takes advantage of
the benefits created by a rating upgrade and ignores the long–term benefits of sustained fiscal
discipline. Since the benefits from a rating upgrade can take longer to materialize than the benefits
of an expansionary fiscal policy, an opportunist politician would opt to over–borrow in order to
guarantee his or her seat in the next elections.
There is a stream of literature on politicians’ opportunistic behaviour. Vaaler et al. (2006)
contend that the issue is generally discussed in the context of developed rather than developing
countries. These authors also argue that while evidence of opportunistic politicians in industrialized
countries is mixed, empirical studies on developing countries mainly confirm the proposal that
politicians follow their political objectives. Relevant studies include Schuknecht (1996), Berger and
Woitek (1997) Block (2002), Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), and Block and Vaaler (2004),
Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008), Klein and Sakurai (2015), Peters (2010).
Specifically, Schuknecht (1996) examined fiscal policies in a sample of 35 developing countries
between 1970 and 1992. His main finding suggests that while electoral cycle has no significant
impact on real output, governments in these countries seem to align government expenditures with
elections. This finding is significant in more open countries where the trade share of GDP exceeds
50%. The relationship between ratings and their determinants has been widely examined following
the innovative studies of Cantor and Packer (1995) and Cantor and Packer (1996). Among many
others, Afonso and Gomes (2011), Erdem and Varli (2014), Gu¨ltekin-Karakas¸ et al. (2011) studied
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the determinants of ratings and found that the impact of fiscal balance on rating assessments is
significant. All these authors conclude that CRAs attach considerable importance to fiscal balance
meaning that the deterioration in fiscal balance is likely to trigger rating downgrades. However,
studies have not to date examined how governments’ behaviour changes after a rating action is
taken. This scarcity in the literature motivates us to examine the impact of rating changes on fiscal
discipline.
The research proposition related to the theory of PBC is that the opportunities created by
rating upgrades play a significant role in governments’ fiscal policies. With the incentives to borrow
more and more cheaply in a period of positive sentiment following a rating upgrade, governments
might find it rational to implement expansionary fiscal policies to guarantee their next term in
office. Although such policies risk triggering future rating downgrades, this is likely to occur in the
distant future, by which time the incumbents might already have been re–elected.
Hypothesis 2: Rating upgrades are likely to be associated with the deterioration of fiscal disci-
pline.
2.2.3 Institutions and Rating–Fiscal Discipline Nexus
According to most of the models surveyed in Panizza et al. (2009), countries issue debt in
order to transfer income from bad times to good times for consumption smoothing purposes. The
counter–cyclicality of sovereign borrowing suggested by these models is not supported by empirical
evidence however (Yeyati, 2009; Gavin and Perotti, 1997). The anecdotal evidence suggests that the
pro–cyclicality of borrowing is mainly driven by sovereign authorities’ tendency to borrow whenever
conditions allow (Panizza et al., 2009). Two constraints emerge limiting the tendency to borrow.
The first is related to sovereigns’ ability to borrow. If the global environment is an obstacle to
issuing debt, sovereigns’ ability to borrow can be significantly jeopardized. If the global economic
cycle is favourable for borrowing, then legal barriers emerge. Sovereign credibility (ratings) is
one of the basic barriers (conditions) to borrowing at lower costs. The second constraint that
disciplines the borrowing tendency is associated with the quality of institutions. In countries where
institutional capacity is strong enough to control politicians’ actions, authorities are circumvented
by legal enforcements that penalize reckless borrowing.
We have credible reasons to differentiate countries according to their level of ”development” to
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examine the rating–fiscal discipline nexus. Ratings often respond to sovereign credibility with a
considerable lag and with marginal rating changes, leading to a certain inertia in ratings. Inertia
in ratings encourages developed countries to accumulate larger amounts of debt since the degree of
inertia is larger in developed countries (Mulder and Monfort, 2000; Dimitrakopoulos and Kolossiatis,
2015). However, this does not prompt CRAs to be more cautious, as stated in Fitch Ratings (2012),
since developed countries can arguably tolerate higher debt burden because of their resilience to
economic shocks. Developing countries, on the other hand, have less opportunity to borrow due to
their lower ratings. Since rating changes are more frequent and can be higher notch changes, they
face the obstacle of stronger credit constraints when they want to borrow.
Countries can also be differentiated by their level of ”development” to classify their fiscal re-
sponse to rating changes. This separation finds support from institutional differences between
developed and developing countries. It is reasonable to postulate that lower institutional quality
in a country implies lower transparency, accountability and rule of law. Authorities in countries
of lower institutional quality are more likely to exploit a rating upgrade since politicians would be
under less threat of legal enforcement or public pressure. Robust institutions in developed coun-
tries, on the other hand, hinder selfish borrowing. Opportunist politicians who tend to over–borrow
would be subject to closer institutional scrutiny and harsh public criticism.
We argue that the fiscal discipline and ratings relationships hypothesized in Hypothesis 1 and
Hypothesis 2 are structurally different in developed and developing countries. Politicians in devel-
oping countries have a more relaxed attitude to exploiting the opportunities created by ratings and
rating changes.
Hypothesis 3: The impact of rating and rating changes on fiscal discipline is more visible in
developing countries.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
In this paper, the use of fiscal discipline refers to the amount of debt burden placed on gov-
ernments. In practice, governments are expected to repay their current expenditures with their
current revenues. If current revenues fall behind current expenditures, the resulting shortfall can
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be met either by running down state assets or from borrowing. The borrowed money is treated as
fiscal deficit, which can bring citizens a certain amount of relaxation and increase political support
for the current government. However, fiscal deficits lead to tax burdens for future generations
and complicate future governments’ ability to pay. Fiscal indicators are among the most impor-
tant indicators examined by CRA analysts. The ability of governments to extract revenues from
taxpayers and users of government services, the elasticity of government revenues with respect to
the average growth rates, and the rigidities in government expenditures are the key factors that
determine countries credit ratings. It is widely believed that a mounting debt burden in a country
creates repayment difficulties that in turn motivate CRAs to downgrade the country’s rating.
We believe that central government debt figures may not show the actual degree of indebtedness
of a country since they may not show off–budget expenditures. Due to these considerations we also
examine other forms of government expenditure. ”General government” is one of the most widely
used categorical classifications to obtain a joint baseline that can be used to assess a country’s
public finance credentials. We focus on measures at the general government level, which is the sum
of central and local governments, including social security expenditures and other extra–budgetary
funds engaged in non–commercial activities. General government measures, however, do not take
into account inter–governmental transactions.
We consider that general government fiscal indicators, which are mostly associated with macroe-
conomic stability and economic growth, better capture a country’s fiscal discipline. In addition,
general government is the most useful cross–country comparator because the bodies responsible for
raising taxes and planning expenditure may differ between countries. All segments of government,
however, ultimately rely on the same population to pay taxes, and sovereignty (of countries) is
expected to have the strongest influence on the distribution of public sector expenditures between
different tiers of government.
In this paper, we examine fiscal discipline on general government debt stock and general gov-
ernment fiscal balance. To eliminate the impact of the scale of the economies on fiscal figures, we
normalize the measures by the size of the economies. We use Moody’s rating categorization to
represent all rating symbols. Although the alpha–numeric representation differs from one CRA to
another, the rating categories are identical.
Moody’s classification has twenty categories based on a country’s degree of perceived creditwor-
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thiness. Credit risk increases from category Aaa (least risk) to category Ca (highest risk). CRAs
establish a threshold to rate groups as ”investment grade” and therefore safe for investment. A
CRA’s consideration below this threshold is risky. The investment grade group includes the cat-
egories Aa1, Aa2, Aa3, A1, A2, A3, Baa1, Baa2, Baa3; the speculative grade group comprises
categories Ba1, Ba2, Ba3, B1, B2, B3, Caa1, Caa2 and Caa3. The data used in this study includes
106 countries for the 1999–2010 period. We did not include Caa2, Caa3, and Ca rated countries
in our analysis because their country fundamentals are very fragile and would introduce distortion.
These countries are Argentina, Belize, Cuba, Ecuador, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay,
Ukraine, and Venezuela. We also omitted Cayman Islands, Bermuda, and Bahamas since many of
the explanatory variables used in the regressions were not available for these countries.
To investigate the impact of rating and rating changes on fiscal discipline, we also use several
controls to represent countries’ economic structure and performance. Table 1 presents the variables,
their descriptions and sources. These variables include GDP percentage change, inflation, ratio of
domestic saving to GDP, and an openness indicator. We also include World Governance Indicators
to quantify the quality of institutions in a country (Kaufmann et al., 1999). These indicators
are individual indices that take values between -2.5 and 2.5 where higher values indicate better
institutional quality.
–INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE–
In an effort to better assess the rating–fiscal discipline nexus at different levels of develop-
ment, the data is divided into two sub–samples: developed and developing countries. We use the
World Bank country classification to determine countries’ level of development. According to this
classification, countries can be broadly grouped into five categories: high income: OECD, high
income: non-OECD, low income, lower middle income, and upper middle income. We group high
income: OECD and high income: non-OECD countries in the ”developed country” category and
low income, lower middle income, and upper middle income countries in the ”developing country”
category. The definition of ”development” based on income level gives us an opportunity to exam-
ine possible differences in fiscal behaviour between high–rated and low–rated countries. We know
that developed countries have significantly higher ratings than developing countries. Table 2 gives
the distribution of countries by their income level, which is used to proxy development level.
–INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE–
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3.2 Methodology
Two main arguments will be tested in this paper. First, we test whether pro–cyclicality and
path-dependence of ratings lend more flexibility to high–rated countries to borrow more and follow
expansionary policies. Second, based on the theory of PBC, we test how rating actions (upgrades
or downgrades) alter fiscal discipline.
We estimate several empirical models of fiscal discipline based on rating levels and rating
changes. We estimate the variants of the following two fixed effects models:
FISDISi,t = α+ β1RATINGi,t + β2CONTROLi,t + ηi + νt + εit (1)
∆FISDISi,t = α
′
+ β
′
1∆RATINGi,t + β
′
2∆CONTROLi,t + η
′
i + ν
′
t + ε
′
it
(2)
where FISDIS is the term for fiscal discipline represented by FINBAL and DEBT , general gov-
ernment financial balance to GDP and general government debt to GDP respectively. RATING is
the ordinal scale of 17 ratings given on long–term foreign currency denominated debt. ∆ represents
the level change of rating in a year. CONTROL is the set of control variables referring to gov-
ernments’ economic, financial and governance prospects. These variables include GDP percentage
change (GDPPC), inflation (INF ), ratio of domestic saving to GDP (SAV ING), an openness in-
dicator (OPENNESS), and the World Bank’s worldwide governance indicators. These indicators
measure institutional quality of countries from six different perspectives: government effectiveness,
control of corruption, voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, regulatory
quality and rule of law (GOV EFF , CORRUPTION , ACCOUNTABLE, POLSTA, REGQUA
and LAW ). ηi is used for heterogeneous country fixed effects, νt is to control for time fixed effects
and finally εit is the error term.
Model 1 is estimated to test for the impact of pro–cyclicality and path–dependence of ratings.
We employ DEBT as the dependent variable. The other fiscal discipline variable FINBAL is
by definition the difference between the revenues and expenditures in general government budgets.
Hence a government’s expenditure performance may not necessarily create a surplus for that year,
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since governments may not be fully capable of controlling revenues 2. The empirical problem in
estimating Model 1 is that fiscal performance indicators may not always represent the performance
of a given year. Governments’ high performance in reducing debt levels may not lead to a sharp
correction in debt stock level. High persistence in fiscal discipline indicators introduces a serial
correlation problem in error terms. We estimate the models using an AR(1) disturbance term to
overcome the serial correlation problem. To allow for the continued effect of ratings, we incorporate
two lags of the level of ratings. This process also enhances the model by absorbing the serial
correlation in the residuals (Hardouvelis and Theodossiou, 2002).
Model 2 is estimated to test the validity of the theory of PBC in sovereign debt space. The
occurrence of rating upgrades is expected to prompt governments to borrow (and spend) oppor-
tunistically to attract support for the next election. We augment the specification in Model 2 by
transforming level variables to annual changes similarly to Aizenman et al. (2013). In doing so, we
estimate how changes in ratings and other control variables affect the changes in sovereign debt
levels.
Since fiscal discipline figures are likely to be affected by their prior status, the formulation in
Model 1 and 2 needs to be dynamic in nature. The dynamic panel formulation in Models 1 and 2
is a potential cause of dynamic panel bias that a fixed effect estimator can not eliminate especially
when the panel’s time dimension is not large enough (Nickell, 1981). Since the time dimension of
the panel data used in this study is short, in order to suppress this bias, we need to apply dynamic
panel linear techniques to check the validity of the chosen specifications in Models 1 and 2. We also
estimate Models 1 and 2 with system generalized method of moments (system–GMM) (Arellano
and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) using lagged first differences as instruments. We take
the variables of the fiscal discipline indicators (DEBT and FINBAL) and ratings (RATING)
as predetermined, meaning that current values of these variables can be correlated with past and
current error terms but not with future error terms. The control variables are taken to be exogenous
to limit the number of instruments due to over–identifying restrictions (OIR). Furthermore, we use
two–step GMM estimation and the Windmeijer (2005) correction that minimizes the downward
bias in standard errors. We test the system–GMM models for second order serial correlation and
2For instance, in crisis years the fiscal balance figures generally deteriorate not necessarily due to expansionary
policies but to reduced revenues.
13
OIR.
We present the expected signs of each variable in Table 1. RATING term in Model 1 should
be positively related to FISDIS (β1 >0) if higher ratings lead to more borrowing incentives (pro–
cyclicality and path–dependence of ratings). Likewise, ∆RATING (β
′
1 >0) is expected to enter
Model 2 with a positive sign indicating opportunistic political behaviour (the theory of PBC). We
expect that control variables GDPPC, SAV ING and OPENNESS will enter the equations with
a negative sign. Higher GDP growth and savings rates along with better foreign trade performance
plausibly impede governments’ borrowing needs. Following a similar reasoning, the rise in INF is
probably associated with higher borrowing needs. The stylized facts suggest that governments may
opt to accelerate borrowing to absorb excess liquidity in the markets in high inflation episodes. In
addition, governments can have fiscal expansionary policies that have inflationary effects. In both
scenarios, high inflation is expected to have distortionary effects on fiscal discipline.
4 Results
In this section, we first present the descriptive statistics and then discuss the main findings.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
We provide descriptive statistics and mean comparison tests for a sample of 1022 country–year
observations in Table 3. The statistics follow a clear pattern showing that, on average, developing
countries are assigned lower ratings than developed countries. This is expected since the country
fundamentals of developed countries are more promising and institutional quality in these countries
is more established. Conversely, the fiscal discipline figures present a mixed picture for developed
and developing countries. Developed countries have 3.78% significantly higher debt to GDP ratio
than developing countries, on average. However, financial balance produces surplus in developed
countries but deficit in developing countries. The difference between developed and developing
countries (-3.2%) is statistically significant. Other control variables and governance indicators
suggest that developed countries have better institutional quality, low inflation, high saving rates
and more openness in foreign trade. Percentage change in GDP is significantly higher in developing
countries, showing remarkably high growth rates in these countries during the last decade.
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–INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE–
Table 3 presents mean comparison tests for the pre–crisis (before 2008) and post–crisis (after
2008) periods. On average, there is no significant difference between pre– and post–crisis peri-
ods for most of the variables. As for the dependent variables used in the regressions, the average
DEBT figures do not show a significant difference between pre– and post–crisis periods, whereas
FINBAL worsened significantly during the post–crisis period. This is probably due to expansion-
ary policies and decelerated revenues regardless of country–specific circumstances. Variables that
show significant differences between pre– and post–crisis periods are saving ratios, which show a
considerable deceleration, probably due to income shocks that reduced households’ saving propen-
sities in the post–crisis period. Likewise, openness figures fell remarkably, which can be explained
by the widespread protectionist policies implemented just after the 2008 crisis.
4.2 Main Findings
Before running the analyses proposed by Models 1 and 2 we checked for multicollinearity of the
data. Table 4 shows that the correlation among the data is low, suggesting that multicollinearity
is not a concern.
–INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE–
We present our estimation results in the following sequence. Our main fiscal discipline measure
in Models 1 and 2 is a sovereign debt ratio, measured by general government debt as a percentage
of GDP (DEBT ). We first estimate a simple specification in Table 5 to test whether high ratings
are conducive to high debt levels (Model 1). In Table 6, we estimate the main specification in
Model 2 to test how governments respond to rating changes. We estimate the extent to which
institutional quality is effective in governments’ responses to rating changes in Table 7. In a similar
specification, we explore the effect of country classification as developed and developing in Table 8.
–INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE–
Table 5 presents the estimation results for the relationship between debt to GDP ratios and
ratings. We include one and two year lagged values of RATING in the specifications to contain
continued effects of past level of ratings. The first column presents the model without any control
variables. In the remaining columns, the control variables enter into the specifications interchange-
ably. We use the six World Bank governance indicators in the regressions. Identifying the most
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appropriate governance indicator is a complicated task in empirical studies (Ozturk, 2015; Thomas,
2010). Among many other perspectives, government effectiveness is of vital importance for politi-
cians to adopt credible fiscal policies. The indicator demonstrates the quality of public services, the
degree of independence from political pressures and the credibility of a government’s commitment
to the formulation of policies. Marcel (2013) posits that fiscal discipline is a combination of fiscal
policy and government effectiveness. In a stronger statement, Andrews (2010) argues that govern-
ment effectiveness is ”...the most prominent indicator” of the World Bank governance indicators.
In public policy literature, government effectiveness is predominantly incorporated to the analysis
(see e.g. Afonso et al., 2010; Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya, 2011; Ligthart and van Oudheusden, 2015).
We employ government effectiveness to proxy institutional quality in our models, but in Table 5 we
present several other results which incorporate the other World Bank governance indicators. This
allows us to observe how sensitive the main results are to variable selection.
The results presented in Table 5 confirm our initial expectations. GDPPC, SAV ING and
OPENNESS enter the equations with a negative sign suggesting that growing economy, larger
share of savings in GDP and high openness in foreign trade tends to reduce DEBT . INF is
estimated with a positive sign as expected, indicating that governments tend to borrow more in
increasing inflationary environments. Although the coefficient estimates of SAV ING are insignif-
icant, the other coefficient estimates are significant at different statistical degrees. We have mixed
results for the different dimensions of institutional quality. The results suggest that government
effectiveness is negatively associated with general government debt to GDP confirming the results
of previous literature (Afonso et al., 2010; Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya, 2011; Ligthart and van Oud-
heusden, 2015). The coefficient estimates of lagged ratings (RATINGt−1 and RATINGt−2) have
significant results. The joint effect of lagged rating variables (RATINGt−1 + RATINGt−2) and
(RATING2t−1 + RATING2t−2) is significantly positive at different levels 3. Taken together, the
results show that higher ratings allow a favourable environment for borrowing. The model esti-
mated in Table 5 incorporates varying degrees of ratings effects on debt to GDP ratio. While the
positive relationship between ratings and debt to GDP ratios remains unchanged, the specifications
of non–linear effects suggest that the degree of increase in debt levels with respect to ratings falls
with higher ratings.
3We do not report F–test results here but they are available upon request.
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Table 5 presents the same specifications with the system–GMM estimator. We treated DEBT
and RATING as predetermined, meaning that current values of these variables can be correlated
with past and current error terms but not with future error terms. The control variables are taken
to be exogenous to limit the number of instruments due to over–identifying restrictions (OIR).
The regressions pass the AR(2) and Hansen OIR specification tests, indicating the validity of the
instruments. The estimation results fully confirm the findings of the fixed effects results presented
in the same table. The results of the system–GMM estimations suggest that high rated countries
are more likely to borrow and accumulate debt. However, non–linear effects of ratings point to a
negative incremental increase with increasing ratings.
We find supporting evidence for Hypothesis 1, which posited that high ratings create incentives
for higher sovereign debt. The results suggest that when ratings increase, countries tend to borrow
more. This finding is robust to different specifications and estimation approaches.
–INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE–
We assess the presence of opportunistic politicians by estimating Model 2. Our main hypothesis
is that opportunistic politicians borrow more in the presence of positive sentiment following a rating
upgrade (Hypothesis 2 ). It may be a consistent motive for politicians to depart from fiscal discipline
to guarantee their seat at the next elections. Table 6 reports the results for the relationship between
rating changes and fiscal discipline. Interestingly, the estimation results show that countries make
an effort to reduce debt levels following a rating upgrade; in other words, rating upgrades are
generally accompanied by increased fiscal discipline in the following year. We present the system–
GMM results in the same table. The results fully confirm the findings in fixed effects estimations.
These results do not support the arguments of Hypothesis 2. Politicians find further support for
fiscal discipline after a rating upgrade.
The finding of a significant relationship between rating changes and fiscal discipline might be
dependent on a country’s level of development and degree of institutional quality. Although we
estimate the models by controlling for cross–country heterogeneity, the fiscal discipline–rating nexus
may take different forms depending on a country’s level of development and highly heterogeneous
institutional quality, institutional enforcements etc.
–INSERT TABLE 7 AROUND HERE–
We initially estimate how the rating upgrades and fiscal behaviour relationship varies with the
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degree of institutional quality. We introduce an interaction term (∆RATINGt−1 ∗ GOV EFF )
in the specification presented in Model 2 to capture the impact of institutional quality. Table 7
presents the results from the specifications containing the interaction term. The coefficient estimate
of ∆RATINGt−1 ∗ GOV EFF is negative in fixed effects and system–GMM results. The results
suggest that rating upgrades in countries with higher levels of institutional quality lead to stronger
fiscal discipline.
–INSERT TABLE 8 AROUND HERE–
Finally, we distinguish between developed and developing countries to detect possible differences
in the relationship between rating changes and fiscal behaviour. Table 8 presents the results when
the interaction term ∆RATINGt−1 ∗DEV is incorporated into the Model 2. The variable DEV
is a dummy to capture the level of development that is defined according to the classification of
the World Bank (see Table 2). We define developed country if a country is classified either in high
income: OECD or high income: non-OECD. The countries of low income, lower middle income,
and upper middle income are grouped as developing countries. The results suggest a significant
and higher fiscal discipline in developed countries. We however note that the impact of being
a developed country is weaker than the impact of institutional quality. From this we infer that
the significant relationship between rating changes and fiscal behaviour for the whole sample is
associated mainly with the institutional quality rather than the level of development.
The results based on institutional quality and country segregation provide valuable insights
into the role of ratings in fiscal discipline. They suggest that in developing countries ratings only
play a significant role in the way they influence borrowing behaviour. Moreover, the role of ratings
in fiscal discipline is strengthened by the degree of institutional quality in developing countries.
Developing countries with higher levels of institutional quality have more incentive to discipline
government indebtedness. Developing countries that have weaker institutions, however, have only
a weak incentive for fiscal discipline. All our results support the previous finding in the literature
that institutional quality plays a significant role in fiscal discipline and borrowing behaviour.
4.3 Robustness Checks
In this section, we present several robustness checks. We firstly study an alternative measure of
fiscal discipline, namely general government budget balance (FINBAL) to examine fiscal behaviour
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responses to rating changes (Vlaicu et al., 2014). We consider that budget balance figures tend to
worsen following a rating upgrade. We present both fixed effect and system–GMM results together
to observe whether endogeneity issues alter the main findings. We should add a cautionary note
here since financial balance is the difference between general government revenues and expenditures.
The volatility in general government revenues may cause unexpected shocks to the balance. This
is especially true during the episodes of crisis. However, since our sample does not contain periods
when government revenues were severely hit by the crisis, we can safely employ FINBAL as an
alternative fiscal discipline measure. The results show that when the dependent variable is general
government fiscal balance to GDP, FINBAL, rating changes hinder politicians from increasing
public spending. We then arrive at a more conclusive result that governments tend to reduce
borrowing and cut expenditure which taken together results in a better fiscal discipline.
–INSERT TABLE 9 AROUND HERE–
We check the robustness of our results with additional tests. For reasons of space we do not
present the results in the paper but they are available upon request. In the second robustness check,
we restrict our sample by removing years 2009 and 2010 to exclude any potential crisis effect. We
know that after the crisis several countries faced downgrades and severe worsening of fiscal stance.
Downgrades with worsening fiscal discipline might have created a spurious relationship between
downgrades and worsening fiscal discipline in earlier estimations. When we exclude those years,
the regression outputs clearly confirm our fundamental findings.
Finally, we estimate an ordered probit model to explore whether or not rating changes trigger
improvement/deterioration in fiscal discipline. The fiscal discipline variables take three categories
as improvement:3, no change: 2 and deterioration: 1 4. Because of the natural ordering of fiscal
discipline, ordered probit modelling is applied to estimate the models in this study.
Let yit be the propensity for the changes in fiscal discipline of country i at time t :
yit = β
′xit + uit (3)
4Since no change in a continuous time series is highly unlikely, we accept changes within 2% as no change. We
tried several other intervals upto 2% as no change, the results are unchanged.
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where β is a kx1 parameter vector, xit is a kx1 vector for the individual characteristics measured at
time t and uit is the stochastic disturbance term. The observability criterion for the three possible
outcomes in the model is given by:
Sit = s if µs−1 ≤ yit ≤ µs for s = 1, 2, 3 (4)
where s =

3 if the country shows improvement in fiscal discipline
2 if the country shows no change in fiscal discipline
1 if the country shows deterioration in fiscal discipline
Note that µ’s are the threshold values where µ0 < µ1 < µ2 < µ3, µ0 = −∞ and µ3 = +∞. The
conditional probability of observing the sth category for country i is then:
Pr(Sit = s|xit) = Pr(µs−1 ≤ β′xit + uit ≤ µs) (5)
Assuming a standard normal distribution for the stochastic disturbance term (uit ∼ N(0, 1) ),
and arranging the terms above, the conditional probabilities could be written as 5:
Pr(Sit = s|xit) = Φ(µs − β′xit)− Φ(µs−1 − β′xit) (6)
where Φ is the normal probability density function with Φ(−∞) = 0 and Φ(+∞) = 1.
–INSERT TABLE 10 AROUND HERE–
By estimating the probit model, we obtain similar results on the rating changes and fiscal
discipline suggesting that rating upgrades further lead to fiscal discipline (see Table 10).
5 Conclusion
The role of ratings in fiscal discipline has been frequently visited, but the empirical evidence
on the subject is somewhat scarce. The issue of fiscal discipline has proved to be pervasive since
5We also estimate the whole model by ordered logit model. The model takes the form of ordered logit if we
assume a logistic distribution for the disturbance term.
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several EU countries were downgraded as a result of their huge fiscal deficits. This paper discusses
various aspects of the ratings–fiscal discipline nexus.
The study provides rich insights into the impact of ratings and rating changes on fiscal discipline.
Firstly, we find evidence that higher ratings are associated with looser fiscal discipline (Hypothesis
1 ). We argue that this is the direct result of pro-cyclicality and path dependence of ratings.
Secondly, the behaviour of governments towards rating changes does not support the theory of
PBC. The results conflict with the theory, suggesting that rating upgrades motivate governments to
further discipline their fiscal figures (Hypothesis 2 ). Finally, we find that the ratings–fiscal discipline
nexus is dependent on countries’ institutional quality and level of development (Hypothesis 3 ). The
significant relationship between rating changes and fiscal discipline is found to be stronger in those
countries of better institutional quality which may not be necessarily associated with the level of
development.
The findings in this paper clearly indicate that the implications of the pro–cyclicality and the
path dependence of ratings work to tighten up looser fiscal discipline. The belief that ratings do
not change so much is an impediment for fiscal discipline among high–rated countries. This belief
is partly nurtured by the asymmetric impact of ratings for high and low–rated countries. The Basel
regulations impose harsher punishments for low ratings, but greatly favour high ratings. Therefore,
low–rated countries can only borrow from a limited number of creditors, but high–rated countries
can take advantage of a large pool of funding available to them at lower costs. This paper also
shows that governments do not opt to exploit the favourable environment that a rating upgrade
creates. The relaxation of credit constraints does not lead to reckless borrowing and consequent
further debt burden.
The paper provides evidence that institutional quality plays a significant role in fiscal discipline.
The countries that manage to separate politics from public services are more successful in terms of
fiscal discipline when ratings are upgraded. We interpret this result as a reflection of governments’
commitment to formulating and implementing policies that cannot be distorted by short–term
political ambitions. These findings lend support to the conclusion in the existing literature that
institutional quality plays a significant role in fiscal discipline and borrowing behaviour. Endeavours
to improve the quality of institutions will be influential in maintaining fiscal discipline and lead to
subsequent higher ratings.
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Our findings have implications for the highly debated issues of ratings and CRAs after the 2008
crisis. The EU fiscal crisis that originated in highly indebted EU countries is at least amplified by
the pro–cyclicality and path dependence of ratings. The belief that high government debt would
not be punished by the CRAs led to a considerable amount of debt accumulation in many EU
countries. The generous ratings in the boom phase of global economy and incremental downgrades
even after 2008 instigated harsh debates about the pro–cyclicality and path dependence of ratings.
The candid intentions to find solutions not only to the issues of pro–cyclicality and path dependence
but many other concerns in credit risk assessments should be regarded as a welcome sign of better
regulation.
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6 Tables
Table 1: Variable Definitions and Sources
Variable Description Source Expected Signs
DEBT General government debt/GDP Moody’s
FINBAL General government budget balance Moody’s
RATING Moody’s ratings (Caa1:1,,Aaa:16) Moody’s +
GOV EFF Government effectiveness The World Bank +/-
CORRUPTION Control of corruption The World Bank +/-
ACCOUNTABLE Voice and accountability The World Bank +/-
POLSTA Political stability and absence of violence and terrorism The World Bank +/-
REGQUA Regulatory quality The World Bank +/-
LAW Rule of law The World Bank +/-
GDPPC GDP percentage change in US dollars (nominal) Moody’s -
SAV ING Domestic savings/GDP Moody’s -
OPENNESS Sum of exports and imports of goods and services/GDP Moody’s -
INF Annual change in consumer prices Moody’s +
Notes: The table demonstrates the variables, their descriptions and sources. The table shows expected
signs of parameter estimates in regression analysis.
Table 2: Distribution of countries by income group
Incomegroup Frequency Percentage
Low income 3 3.23
Lower middle income 21 22.58
Upper middle income 25 26.88
High income: OECD 27 29.03
High income: non-OECD 17 18.28
Total 93 100.00
Notes: The classification is based on the World Bank definition.
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Table 5: Level of Sovereign Debt and Ratings
Fixed Effects System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DEBTt−1 0.910*** 0.911*** 0.902*** 0.905*** 0.907*** 0.903*** 0.897*** 0.855***
(0.0305) (0.0302) (0.0304) (0.0300) (0.0299) (0.0282) (0.0285) (0.0657)
2∑
i=1
RATINGt−i 2.092*** 2.093*** 1.991*** 1.960*** 1.923*** 1.675*** 1.781*** 4.559***
(0.638) (0.0276) (0.626) (0.662) (0.660) (0.0263) (0.0262) (-0.196)
2∑
i=1
RATING2t−i -0.0851*** -0.0736*** -0.0779*** -0.0796*** -0.0767*** -0.0916*** -0.094*** -0.298
(0.0269) (0.645) (0.0274) (0.0282) (0.0281) (0.503) (0.529) (2.693)
GOV EFF -3.859** 12.83
(1.744) (8.497)
CORRUPTION -2.408
(2.225)
ACCOUNTABLE -0.508
(1.863)
POLSTA 0.154
(1.105)
REGQUA 3.465**
(1.631)
LAW 4.057**
(1.554)
GDPPC -0.107* -0.107* -0.107* -0.104* -0.267*** -0.258*** -0.545
(0.0566) (0.0559) (0.0557) (0.0558) (0.0485) (0.0490) (0.475)
SAV ING 0.00643 0.00623 0.000384 -0.000508 -0.719
(0.0744) (0.0735) (0.0682) (0.0674) (0.555)
OPENNESS -0.0108 -0.0196 -0.0295* -0.0501
(0.0148) (0.0172) (0.0150) (0.0990)
INF 0.539*** 0.545*** 0.963***
(0.149) (0.153) (0.369)
CONSTANT -4.033 -1.971 -1.342 -2.342 -2.759 -1.024 -0.392 12.43
(4.349) (4.008) (3.870) (4.031) (3.911) (3.735) (3.552) (11.84)
Observations 836 836 836 836 836 836 836 836
Number of countries 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93
R-squared 0.779 0.785 0.784 0.783 0.783 0.810 0.810
Number of instruments 30
AR1 0.017
AR2 0.145
Hansen OIR test p-value 0.619
Notes: The table displays both the fixed effects and the system GMM regression results. The dependent variable is DEBT . The
definition of dependent variable and regressors are defined in Table 1. Regarding the system GMM regressions, we estimate two-step
system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) correction. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The figures in parentheses
for the
2∑
i=1
RATINGt−i and
2∑
i=1
RATING2t−i are the standard errors obtained from F-tests of joint significance. ***, **, and *
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
30
Table 6: Sovereign Debt Responses to Rating Changes
Fixed Effects System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆DEBTt−1 0.251***
(0.001)
∆RATINGt−1 -1.914** -1.995** -1.993** -2.419** -2.386** -2.377** -3.732**
(0.961) (0.949) (0.950) (1.028) (1.019) (1.019) (0.019)
GDPPC -0.147*** -0.147*** -0.157** -0.172** -0.170** -0.202***
(0.0557) (0.0557) (0.0631) (0.0724) (0.0731) (0.000)
∆GOV EFF -0.173 -0.644 -0.595 -0.573 -0.157
(1.197) (1.171) (1.156) (1.151) (0.904)
∆INF 0.334*** 0.330*** 0.324*** 0.424***
(0.0880) (0.0862) (0.0862) (0.000)
∆SAV ING 0.0797 0.0806 0.054
(0.0770) (0.0774) (0.464)
∆OPENNESS 0.0154 -0.082
(0.0235) (0.333)
CONSTANT 1.848** 5.503*** 5.505*** 6.894*** 7.015*** 7.192*** 1.369
(0.770) (0.526) (0.527) (0.670) (0.711) (0.826) (0.312)
Observations 929 929 929 929 929 929 929
Number of countryid 93 93 93 93 93 93 93
R-squared 0.237 0.262 0.262 0.308 0.310 0.311
Number of instruments 34
AR1 0.001
AR2 0.226
Hansen OIR test p-value 0.245
Notes: The table displays both the fixed effects and the system GMM regression results. ∆ denotes for
the annual change. The dependent variable is ∆DEBT . The definition of the dependent variable and the
regressors are given in Table 1. Regarding the system GMM regressions, we estimate two–step system GMM
with Windmeijer (2005) correction. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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Table 7: Sovereign Debt Responses to Rating Changes: The Impact of Institutional Quality
Fixed Effects System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆DEBTt−1 0.303***
(0.007)
∆RATINGt−1 -0.557* -0.702** -0.690** -1.177** -1.157** -1.134** -1.122
(0.284) (0.319) (0.323) (0.495) (0.508) (0.501) (0.513)
∆RATINGt−1 ∗GOV EFF -2.409*** -2.286*** -2.294*** -2.160*** -2.145*** -2.163*** -1.825**
(0.616) (0.670) (0.677) (0.707) (0.709) (0.717) (0.045)
GDPPC -0.138** -0.137** -0.148** -0.161** -0.158** -0.189*
(0.0569) (0.0569) (0.0633) (0.0721) (0.0726) (0.056)
∆GOV EFF -0.576 -1.008 -0.962 -0.933 -1.013
(1.259) (1.256) (1.237) (1.229) (0.464)
∆INF 0.323*** 0.319*** 0.310*** 0.652***
(0.0851) (0.0836) (0.0827) (0.000)
∆SAV ING 0.0703 0.0714 0.01
(0.0755) (0.0761) (0.976)
∆OPENNESS 0.0216 -0.068
(0.0252) (0.285)
CONSTANT 1.910** 5.313*** 5.318*** 6.671*** 6.779*** 7.025*** 1.202
(0.769) (0.462) (0.465) (0.542) (0.572) (0.724) (0.333)
Observations 929 929 929 929 929 929 929
Number of countries 93 93 93 93 93 93 93
R-squared 0.268 0.289 0.289 0.333 0.334 0.335
Number of instruments 35
AR1 0.000
AR2 0.454
Hansen OIR test p-value 0.15
Notes: The table displays both the fixed effects and the system GMM regression results. ∆ denotes for the annual
change. The dependent variable is ∆DEBT . The definition of the dependent variable and the regressors are given
in Table 1. Regarding the system GMM regressions, we estimate two–step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005)
correction. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%,
5%, and 10%.
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Table 8: Sovereign Debt Responses to Rating Changes: The Impact of Level of Development
Fixed Effects System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆DEBTt−1 0.299***
(0.003)
∆RATINGt−1 -1.256** -1.362*** -1.360*** -1.981*** -1.975*** -1.942*** -3.230**
(0.488) (0.481) (0.481) (0.474) (0.474) (0.476) (0.024)
∆RATINGt−1 ∗DEV -1.307* -1.257* -1.257* -0.858 -0.808 -0.852 -6.876***
(0.684) (0.674) (0.674) (0.656) (0.656) (0.659) (0.002)
GDPPC -0.146*** -0.146*** -0.157*** -0.171*** -0.168*** -0.116
(0.0281) (0.0281) (0.0273) (0.0291) (0.0293) (0.278)
∆GOV EFF -0.171 -0.636 -0.590 -0.563 -11.259
(1.526) (1.481) (1.481) (1.481) (0.302)
∆INF 0.329*** 0.326*** 0.318*** 0.312***
(0.0448) (0.0449) (0.0460) (0.007)
∆SAV ING 0.0759 0.0767 -0.044
(0.0562) (0.0562) (0.892)
∆OPENNESS 0.0180 -0.080
(0.0233) (0.349)
CONSTANT 1.853*** 5.470*** 5.472*** 6.851*** 6.969*** 7.172*** 9.290
(0.577) (0.536) (0.537) (0.553) (0.560) (0.619) (0.166)
Observations 929 929 929 929 929 929 929
Number of countries 93 93 93 93 93 93 93
R-squared 0.240 0.265 0.265 0.310 0.311 0.312
Number of instruments 35
AR1 0.002
AR2 0.819
Hansen OIR test p-value 0.541
Notes: The table displays both the fixed effects and the system GMM regression results. ∆ denotes for the
annual change. The dependent variable is ∆DEBT . The definition of the dependent variable and the regressors
are given in Table 1. DEV is a dummy variable that takes 1 if a country is a developed country and 0 otherwise.
We group high income: OECD and high income: non-OECD countries in the ”developed country” category and
low income, lower middle income, and upper middle income countries in the ”developing country” category (see
Table 2). Regarding the system GMM regressions, we estimate two–step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005)
correction. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%,
5%, and 10%.
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Table 10: Sovereign Debt Responses to Rating Changes: Ordered Probit Model Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆RATINGt−1 -0.483*** -0.444*** -0.452*** -0.444*** -0.453*** -0.451***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDPPC -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.064*** -0.064***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆GOV EFF 0.249 0.257 0.247 0.220
(0.479) (0.467) (0.484) (0.533)
∆INF -0.007 -0.006 0.003
(0.548) (0.582) (0.790)
∆SAV ING -0.012 -0.009
(0.409) (0.523)
∆OPENNESS -0.012**
(0.016)
Threshold 1 (µ1) -0.201*** -0.802*** -0.804*** -0.799*** -0.790*** -0.796***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Threshold 2 (µ2) 0.220*** -0.326*** -0.328*** -0.323*** -0.313*** -0.317***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 929 929 929 929 929 929
Pseudo-R-squared 0.0133 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.102 0.105
Chi-squared 25.40 192.0 192.5 192.9 193.6 199.5
Log-likelihood -939.2 -855.9 -855.7 -855.5 -855.2 -852.2
Notes: The table reports the results of ordered probit model (Equation 3). The model
explores whether or not rating changes trigger change in fiscal discipline. The dependent
variable is an ordinal variable that takes the value of 3 with fiscal improvement (improve-
ment:3 ), 2 with no fiscal change (no change:2 ), and 1 with fiscal (deterioration: 1 ). ∆
denotes for the annual change. The definition of the dependent variable and the regressors
are given in Table 1. Robust p-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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